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In Szelenyi’s reading, „Weber is one of the early postmodern, post-Enlightment theorists,” a 
„liberal in despair.” He considers Weber’s „Entzauberung a generic concept,” and asserts that 
„rationalization is a narrower notion which does not quite capture the complexity of the 
human conditions (...) under modernity.” The point is, thus, that disenchantment lies deeper 
than rationalization. What is the magic that we have lost? Szelenyi gives a few hints. He 
alludes to „our ability to make moral judgments, our ability to experience the work beyond 
instrumental reason, with our full personality, to be engaged in erotic relationships rather than 
just sex acts” and a general „loss of meaning.” Not being a Weber scholar, my remarks are 
restricted to Szelenyi’s points. They all revolve around the problem of in what ’magic’ 
consists.  
 
1. Capitalist re-enchantment 
 
Szelenyi himself refers to another „generic” concept, related to ’magic’ that was developed 
(though not invented) by Marx. This is commodity fetishism, a concept meant to comprise the 
essence of capitalism and that is another generic concept. Marx deliberately chose it for its 
religious connotations and used it to suggest that our normal, common attitudes towards 
goods and services on the market are in fact socially constructed and are enjoined on us (both 
as consumers and producers, employers and employees, etc.) by the hidden forces of 
capitalism. The term „fetishism” implies, however, some kind of a misunderstanding, even 
perversion as well, something that right reason and rational thinking must uncover. Even after 
the demise of religious beliefs, there is still a need to dispel the clouds of superstition about 
how commodities get their values. Marx indeed concludes that  
 
The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does 
not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, 
and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, 
demands for society a certain material ground-work or set of conditions of existence 
which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of 
development (Marx, 2007 [1867], 92). 
 
Thus, commodity fetishism is but both a remnant of religious thinking and a new, strong form 
of illusion that needs to be combatted by reason (conscious regulation and planned economy). 
This is, of course, not consistent with the story of disenchantment in and of the modern world. 
Szelenyi notes this and quickly adds that „[t]he problem Weber saw was not an enchanted 
world, rather one of disenchantment. For Weber, the problem with modernity was not that 
there is not enough rationality, it was too much rationality” (his emphasis). However, even a 
cursory overview of the literature on fethisism and the more or less Marxist criticisms of 
modernity and modern capitalism proves that notions of illusion, distorted communication, 
ideology, false consciousness, the rule of irrationality and other, similar ones are all studied 
extensively and that many critical philosophers and sociologists think that like Cipolla’s 
magic, capitalism holds us strongly within its artificial world of material idols. This obviously 
suggests that at least some „magic” is still very much part of modernity. The enlightment 
project has not achieved its goal, we are constantly enchanted by a whirling carnival of 
commodities, services, experiences, ideas, and so on, provided by for us in ever-increasing 
quantities and varieties every day. Is the story of a disenchantment credible at all? I leave this 
question open because the point is not whether or not critics of capitalism who hold such 
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views are right, but that the thesis about a gradual or even accomplished disenchantment 
brought about by modernity (whatever that means) is not trivially true. 
 
2. Bureaucratic re-enchantment 
 
2.1. Weber 
Szelenyi thinks that rationalization is a „narrower notion” than disenchantment. Again, there 
is an immense literature on this Weberian notion that cannot be discussed here. Let me, 
therefore, pull out a single thread out of it. It has been long noted that even for Weber 
rationalization, an extension of bureaucratic ethos and of legal logic (these terms are not 
identical, of course), has always carried with it a sort of irrationality. Faith in reason remains a 
sort of faith, after all. By way of explaining charismatic authority, Weber makes an interesting 
observation:  
 
In traditionalist periods, charisma is the great revolutionary force. The likewise 
revolutionary force of ’reason’ works from without: by altering the situations of life and 
hence its problems, finally in this way changing men’s attitudes toward them; or it 
intellectualizes the individual. Charisma, on the other hand, may effect a subjective or 
internal reorientation born out of suffering, conflicts, or enthusiasm. It may then result 
in a radical alteration of the central attitudes and directions of action with a completely 
new orientation of all attitudes toward the different problems of the ’world.’ In 
prerationalistic periods, tradition and charisma between them have almost exhausted the 
whole of the orientation of action (Weber 1978, 245). 
 
What is especially remarkable in this paragraph is, first, the noted similarity between charisma 
and reason as revolutionary forces; and second, the reference made to the change of attitudes, 
situations, problems of human beings as the results and effects of charisma and reason. Weber 
makes a difference here, since he explains the mechanism of charisma as an „internal 
reorientation” and the mechanism of reason as working „from without” and adds the 
somewhat curious notion of „intellectualization.” It is, again, not my job to analyze Weber’s 
argument here in detail, but it is important to point out that the difference between the two 
operations is not at all clear. Both charisma and reason can be said to be born „outside” but 
change both the outer and inner world of the subjects in similar ways. For instance, if reason 
„intellectualizes” us, then charisma makes us „enthusiastic.” This is why both can be 
revolutionary forces.  
 I cannot go into further details about how Weber tries to explain the change of 
authority. He alludes here to the role of charisma in traditional periods and discusses the 
routinization of charisma. Similarly, reason as a revolutionary force may turn into 
bureaucratic routine and a system of legal rules. But the questions remains: does such a 
routinization of a once-revolutionary force eliminate the magic of revolution entirely? For 
every revolution as a force has something magical, or perhaps, to use Edmund Burke’s more 
adequate concept, something sublime, about it. Unless one believes in a supreme, divine force 
who is beneficial, providential towards mankind, to whom all forces of nature and society are 
ultimately subjected, sheer, morally neutral force remains in a deep sense sublime, something 
that we hold in awe. And the sublimity of every revolution has a magnetizing, mesmerizing, 
enchanting effect on the participants, both on those who support and who resist it. True 
reactionaries are as much fascinated with the Revolution as are revolutionaries themselves.  
 The revolution of reason is politically nonviolent. One may commit horrendous crimes 
in the name of reason, of course, but Weber’s point about the revolutionary force of reason 
(ratio) does not imply outright violence and it is not an historical reference. It 
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„intellectualizes” us and intellectualization is contrary to physical violence, though possibly 
not absolutely contrary to more refined, psychological types of violence. In any case, the age 
and rule of reason is not entirely without some aspects of revolution and thereby the point 
about the lure of revolution and our fascination with it as a force applies to the revolution of 
reason as well. It is not entirely accidental that we sometimes use the metaphor of the „force 
of logic” (there is a logic of force as well which is a meta-metaphor). A philosopher, a 
scientist, a scholar cannot regard logic a force because reason, to which logic appeals and 
from which it stems, is the defining feature of humanity in philosophy and science alike, and 
revolting against it simply does not make sense. Yet the phrases „tyranny of reason” and 
„force of logic” are not just Romantic excesses. They refer to a very human attitude against 
imposing anything, including our own reason, upon us. By thus alienating our own reason 
from ourselves, it becomes a possible force, not dissimilar to other forces of nature, of society, 
of fate against which we are defenseless. 
 
2.2. Kafka 
Weber scholarship has, for instance, found a remarkable congeniality between him and Franz 
Kafka. To illuminate the possibility of a queer, yet very real re-enchantment enacted by the 
revolution of reason in modernity, let me expand upon this comparison a little bit.  
 Douglas Litowitz (2011) argues that 
 
Although Kafka’s writings were generally darker than Weber’s, they both prophesied 
the ascendancy of instrumental rationality and bureaucratic reasoning (…) Weber used 
the word disenchantment to describe the condition where ’the ultimate and most 
sublime values have retreated from public life,’ and this is precisely the legal universe 
that Kafka depicted in his novels The Trial and The Castle (…) Weber mused that 
modern man culd soon be facing a ’polar night’ of hyper-rationalization (…) [whereas] 
Kafka depicted legal systems that possessed a superficial rationality which always, upon 
closer inspection, proved to be more a mere cover for ambiguity and arbitrariness (49, 
original emphasis). 
 
Notice the words „hyperrationality” and „superficial rationality,” connected with ambiguity, 
arbitrariness; and later in the text: the legal system becoming opaque (53),  pointless, alien 
and ultimately „as mysterious as the secret world of priests and shamans” (56).  
 Similarly, Torben B. Jørgensen (2012) writes about the enigmatic nature of Kafka’s 
portrayal of bureaucracy with its closedness and constant self-reference as the source of its 
own legitimacy. Out of this only a no less arbitrary, as he puts it, „trans-rational,” political 
escape is possible (205). Malcolm Warner (2007), too, thinks that both Kafka and Weber 
„articulated a reaction of deep ’cultural pessimism’ that they derived from the onset of 
’modernization’” (1020). There is, thus, a strong view among scholars that what Szelenyi 
calls disenchantment is, surprisingly perhaps, accompanied by a deep pessimism about a 
strange sort of re-enchantment in modernity in Weber’s writings and predictions.  
 But what is this „re-enchantment”? How should we understand opacity, arbitrariness, 
groundless self-reference, mysteriousness, pointlessness, trans-rationality, superficial 
rationality, as being somehow contrary to the rule of reason? It was quite fitting to turn to 
Kafka to figure out the nature of re-enchantment. For in his writings, and especially in The 
Castle, Kafka managed to create a total world which is suffocating, depressing and dark, yet 
is not without some magic, some low-key, yet real poetry. In one of first direct contacts to the 
Castle, by phone, K., the protagonist of the novel, has the following experience: 
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A humming, such as K. had never before heard on the telephone, emerged from the 
receiver. It was as if the murmur of countless childish voices – not that it was really a 
murmur, it was more like the singing of voices, very very far away – as if that sound 
were forming, unlikely as that might be, into a single high, strong voice, striking the ear 
as if trying to penetrate further than into the mere human sense of hearing. K. heard it 
and said nothing; he had propped his left arm on the telephone stand, and listened like 
that (21). 
 
Bureaucracy is, at least in some sense, a poetic experience. Is this irony? Of course it is. But 
only to reader: once we are in it, enchantment begins. And Kafka goes on. As many 
commentators have noted, his prose itself is a mesmerizing one, with endless monologues, 
almost whole chapters in reported speech, a very vulgar, yet still aesthetically sensible style.  
Officials are treated as idols, almost like the Roman lares, rescued from fire, served as 
masters, yet not adored. They need to be satisfied sexually, yet „[t]he relationship between the 
women and the officials, believe me, is very difficult to judge, or perhaps very easy. There is 
never any lack of love in this place. The officials’ love is never unrequited (173).” There is 
nothing beautiful, wonderful, elevated about love, yet it is, Olga asserts, still love. 
Klamm, the mysterious senior official whom K. tries to meet personally by always fails to 
do so, can only be observed: 
 
Through the small hole, which had obviously been made in it for purposes of 
observation, he could see almost the whole of the next room. Mr Klamm was sitting at a 
desk in the middle of the room, in a comfortable round armchair, brightly illuminated 
by an electric light-bulb hanging in front of him. He was a stout, ponderous man of 
middle height. His face was still smooth, but his cheeks drooped slightly with the 
weight of advancing age. He had a long, black moustache, and a pair of pince-nez, set 
on his nose at a crooked angle and reflecting the light, covered his eyes (36). 
 
Klamm is singularly unattractive, both as a man and as an official, yet this is all the more 
intriguing to K. who is on a perennial quest for power, for meaning, for love, for everything 
that this life can offer to us but always and invariably fails to achieve any of these. Klamm, as 
the god of the Castle, never speaks to anybody. But K.’s faith in the mystery of the Castle 
never falters. The new enchantment offered by the revolution of reason may be cheap and 
miserable, painful and ugly, but can we really say that the „old,” sunken, premodern 
enchantment was any better? At a point, Frieda, K.’s fiancée, tells K. about her desire to 
emigrate to France or Spain with him but her desire and her reference to these countries are 
absolutely hollow. Whether or not France or Spain really exist, we cannot know. Life in The 
Castle is complete and total, and enchantment is not missing from it.  
 Our world is not as dark as that of the Castle though at certain points of the history of 
modernity, in totalitarian regimes, in wars, in all kinds of inhuman depravity, it did turn into 
something close to it. Still, our normal, colorful, buorgeois lives are evidently at odds with the 
nightmarish, subterrainean lives of Kafka’s heroes. But the point is that on a closer look the 
pleasures and delights modernity treats us with can suddenly turn into something frightening. 
The kind of re-enchantment that bureucratic-rationalist modernism has brought upon us 
comes in form of senseless chatters, or internet chats that are being served to us by a highly 
sophisticated technology; in form of organizational routines of what to do, when, and how; in 
form of addiction to TV series, news, blogs, whatever we constantly watch and listen to; and 
in form of sexuality elevated above eros. However, this is not disenchantment. Rather, this is 






Such criticisms of modernity are not novel at all. Szelenyi’s mourning over the loss of 
meaning, eros, self-fulfillment in labor, and even morality, fits in a long and strong 
intellectual-spiritual tradition sharing of which seems to be a matter of taste and personal 
experience, rather than of science. Szelenyi himself alludes to Weber’s personal history in 
explaining the sociologist’s views on modernity and it appears that his own personal history is 
very much part of the story about disenchantment and modernity. In fact, there is nothing 
wrong with making the development of a scholar’s preferences explicit, although I have some 
reservations about the reliability of some of Szelenyi’s conjectures with respect to Weber’s 
views. Anyhow, Szelenyi concurs with Weber’s pessimism for reasons that appear to have a 
strong personal aspect. This helps me to make my final points about disenchantment and re-
enchantment here. 
As I alluded to it, many tenets of the disenchantment conception are applicable to 
premodern times and societies as well. Those who, like me, share the view that human nature 
is less flexible and changing than social constructivists tend to think, may agree that 
modernity can be described, more or less adequately, and among other things, by growing 
rationalization, legalism, and bureaucratization, but are less convinced by the corollary thesis 
that this amounts to being or getting disenchanted from something. The reason lies in human 
nature which is such that we cannot live without fantasies, images, tales, myths, values. We 
may live in an age of machines but the concept of the machine is itself also an image. 
Monsters do not live in the sea any more, but they are amongst us. The Leviathan has come 
ashore and lives with us and keeps both the powerful and the subjects fascinated. Gone is the 
age of knights, as Burke acclaimed and lamented, yet the lure of war has not tarnished, on the 
contrary: it has seduced millions of men in the past two centuries. Briefly, what has (perhaps) 
changed is simply being enchanted by other things and in other ways than, supposedly, our 
ancestors were once.  
Further, it is perhaps no more the classical magic (Zauber) that enchants us. We may 
seek thrill rather than enthrallment, excitement rather than charm and these distinctions are 
important. The grace of classical painting has been replaced by the rigor of abstract painting. 
The lure of classical music has considerably smaller effect on modern ears than the clattering 
of rock music. Geometry and monotony are important concepts for a modernity conceived 
and interpreted in terms of rationality and bureaucracy. However, there is so much more about 
modern life and modern societies that work contrary to these tendencies. Being „thrilled” and 
„excited” have become rather dull expressions, forms of courtesy. Abstract arts and 
monotonous music are often shunned at as being meant for subcultures or for special places 
and occasions. Popular culture has never really absorbed abstract arts, or at least it has never 
become identical with it. Hard rock and techno are well-embedded styles in modernity, but no 
less are pop music, jazz, and other, more colorful types and genres. Our natural capacity to 
desire and appreciate fantasy, variety, surprise, and magic simply cannot be done away with. 
 And there is a last point which I deem the most substantial one. Though Weber 
convincingly argued for the transformative force of Protestantism and his terms discussed 
here (rationalization, legalization, etc.) refer to historically fairly well-established 
developments and changes. However, aren’t there deeper and more pristine trends of 
„disenchantment” in Weber’s sense, along with a specially Occidental trend of re-
enchantment? What I have in mind is the so-called individualization of and in the West. As 
Charles Taylor argued (1989), now quite a long ago, the really crucial change occured very 
early in Western history. His analysis of St Augustine’s philosophy is particularly 
illuminating. Augustine’s revolution was to make, indeed, to discover the distinction between 
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what is „in us” and what is „outside of us,” and to orient our reflection towards the inner 
world. As Taylor puts it, „It is hardly an exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who 
introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it ot the Western tradition of 
thought” (131). Of course, within our soul we should not seek ourselves in the modern sense 
but God. However, by constantly observing our own conscience, examining our moral life, we 
find our own selves often enigmatic, mysterious, too deep to be comprehensible. En route to 
God within ourselves, we encounter spirits, daimons, evil and good alike, as well as hidden 
desires, inexplicable reactions, suppressed memories – and this world is a magical one, and 
perhaps more magical than nature can ever be. And God is the greatest mystery, occupying 
the deepest part of the soul, making it literally unfathomable. Paradoxically, however, by 
facing, fighting, accomodating ourselves to this world we also rationalize it, try to make it 
transparent, explain God Himself as the scholastics did, who had been the first Rationalizers, 
long before Protestantism appeared. Disenchantment and (re)enchantment go hand in hand, 
and as long as our journey towards the centre of the human is not ended, we are no more 
entitled to be „pessimists” about disenchantment than to be „optimists” about a constant re-
enchantment. Ironically, Szelenyi’s own concepts: morality, eros, meaning, self-fulfillment 
are deeply rooted in this Augustinian tradition. Putting these concepts, especially as concepts, 
into the forefront has ever been a defining feature of Western thinking. By conceptualizing 
our inner world we rationalize it; yet our concepts and our philosophy keep us fascinated by 
human nature. What is missing is, perhaps, the idea of there being an unfathomable essence in 
the depth of our soul. Whether religious faith in this, Augustinian and Western sense is a 
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